

Notes on HK Dec 20, 1983

Issue (p. ix-x): To what extent does one focus on "dealing with a Hitler" ("providing options for doing so, so as to discourage the emergence of one; to fail to do this is to assure the appearance of a Hitler". This was my main argument in 1958-59: that K was not Hitler, but could be tempted to become one, or could be replaced by one if we did not "buy insurance.")

p. 32. "Credibility depends on being willing to accept the other side's retaliatory blow." (Especially, in cold blood: e.g., having had a chance to calculate and contemplate probable consequences, because of an earlier crisis or threat).

This is not strictly true; even if the consequences (if calculated) seem obvious "unacceptable," it may be "not-incredible" that a threatened or committed retaliation will be understaken (or a comparable response even without a prior commitment): on the basis of 91) a "mad" response; (2) instability; (3) associated false alarms, preemption; (4) a bureaucratic response, on the basis of prior planning, commitments, routines. (Instability includes a low-level delegated, unauthorized or miscalculated response, a form of bureaucratic behavior).

One of my speculative findings is that a bureaucracy is capable of arbitrarily reckless or brutal behavior, without "human" restraints, either directed from the top or carried out "blindly" at lower levels. That is to say that any threatened behavior can be credible; coming from a violent bureaucracy: much more easily than when issued by a single, normal-appearing human. (even when such humans "man" the bureaucracy).

To say this is to say that even a "mutual annihilation machine" and even a Domsday Machine can be a basis for (bureaucratic) threats credible enough to be effective.

Thus, HK notes in the next paragraph that "there are many military planners who oppose having limited war capabilities to handle modest provocations." This is an example of bureaucratic madness/recklessness; it is also a description of the Presidentially-directed JSCP as he wrote, with respect to fighting Russians! Nor should such threats be regarded as "incredible," or necessarily ineffective.

In fact, the situation was much closer to a "Splendid" First Strike capability that HK imagined possible for either side!

(And the Soviets knew it; although K may also have realized that Ike would refuse to admit anything like this, lest he reveal the U@, and force K to denounce it or attack it).

2.

Nuclear Winter destroys evacuation as a tactic. The attacker can target empty cities; by burning them, he kills everybody (including his own people). This is an advantage of a Doomsday Machine as a deterrent--to blackmail, evacuation.

--Is it not meaningful to speak of "Hitlerian threats" made defensively? In support of a status quo? Consider, after all, the threats Hitler posed when he was on the defensive (refusing to retreat in Russia, defending Germany). Scorched earth; V-1 and V-2 ("revenge" weapons). Hitler's revenge for bombing of Germany. Threats against Jews in 1938.

--Was not Hitler's example necessary, and his scale of challenge necessary, to legitimize adopting the strategic bombing doctrine of the postWWI era? And to get us through the atomic and thermonuclear revolutions in planning? I.e., to implement the construction of the Doomsday Machine (inadvertently, in the effort to create an extermination machine).

("If it were not for the fact that my colleagues and I have lived through this era [the later part of the Hitler era], most of us would need to have much more knowledge of history than in fact we possess before we could find illustrations to make credible the kind of threats that Hitler made and the reactions of his opponents.) It is interesting to point out that in 1930 and even later practically nobody would have conjectured that the British and the French and others would be subjected to the challenges that they came to face. Even less could they have foreseen the inadequate reactions of the challenged nations." p. 286

Likewise, the effects of the '30's in delegitimizing pacificism, England's "weakness," appeasement, arms control and disarmament conferences and efforts (but not, anti-Sovietism! helped by purges and Nazi-Soviet Pact).

Kahn does recognized the tension between Type II and Type I Deterrence; though he assumes that we "must" use Type II, so must be prepared to beef up Type I in crises.

AJW virtually ignores Type II; yet the cases he mentions, when Type I is "strained," making it "delicate," involve Soviet concern at a possible US first-strike, either preemptively or in support of our treaty obligations, or else the prospect of Soviet defeat in an important local war (hardly likely unless the US had used at least tactical nucleapons first).

Yet AJW, Brodie, etc. devote little or no attention to reducing Soviet apprehension about the possibility of US FI or FS--though they criticize vulnerable "deterrent" (actually, vulnerable first-strike) forces as "tempting" or "inviting" attack, and reducing stability.

HK

- While ignoring (ignoring) that
Credible - to - splendid FS Cap.
(with no plans, + little prep., for CW)
is 2) the basis of US planning
and is (b) certainly not unrealistic
(given realities he ignores,
reversing asymmetries he responds)

- HK does give the reasons for such a
posture

- but ignores alternatives:

- "Not credible FS Cap."
- Arms reductions w/out Europe;
MBFR, "Rapacki"; "Euro. settlement ..."

- CSR (real meaning of "Nuclear Det.")
= most cases - unless/until
SU replies to CSR?)

- Reliable European deterrent: joint or
German. (FS? - Pershing / mine, N..)

(UK)

are not the Pushings (+ union?) for
(European? or US) FS / EU?

Add ~~the~~ to N-bank, for Centre policy!

HK

Insistence against "unreliability":
CD is reasonable,
not CF.

RAND "mission" — to focus attention
on "the problems of the '60's" (p. 7)
not Would have
abolition

(Test Ban
NFU

Vehicle Test Ban

C+C

Non-prolif.

Reduction

Avoidance of MIRV

Minimum Deterrence

but "detering" [SU, for '] GW.!

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